Russia and Bulgaria

The true intentions of a person are revealed through their actions. Similarly, the true strategy of a state in the realm of security can be understood through an analysis of the systematic actions taken in the diplomatic, social, and military spheres. According to security science, strategy is a combination of long-term goals, means, and methods employed to achieve desired outcomes, safeguard national interests, manage risks, and address threats in a dynamic international environment.

This analytical approach not only enables the identification of a nation’s intentions but also reveals its priorities, weaknesses, and resources, which are key to understanding its policies and behavior.

What are the forbidden truths in Bulgarian history?

The analysis of the presented facts leads to the conclusion that Russia has often pursued a policy aimed at weakening Bulgarian positions and national identity to protect its own geopolitical interests. The following aspects outline the main elements of this strategy:

1. Direct conquest and cultural assimilation: Russia has sought to destroy independent Bulgarian states or cultural centers (e.g., the Kazan Khanate) through wars, forced Christianization (some of the Bulgarians in Asia are musilms), and the replacement of historical identity to integrate these territories into the empire.
2. 
   Encouragement of de-Bulgarization and ethnic manipulation: Examples include support for the Hellenization and Serbization of Bulgarian territories, the resettlement of Bulgarians to Russian territories, and the organization of cultural propaganda in Macedonia and Trace.
3. Economic and political pressure: Russia employed economic and political mechanisms, such as the relocation of the Bulgarian population and the suppression of revolutionary movements, to ensure dependence on its influence.
4. Encouragement of internal division: The Russian approach included support for projects aimed at federalization or dualistic structures that excluded the possibility of a unified Bulgarian state, such as the proposal for a Serbo-Bulgarian dualistic monarchy.
5. Ideological and military manipulation: The Russian army and administration often placed Bulgarians in a dependent role, minimizing the significance of Bulgarian efforts, such as during the 1877–1878 war, and promoting myths of Russian self-sacrifice.
6. Control over the church issue: Russia’s involvement in church affairs aimed to limit the independence of the Bulgarian Exarchate by placing it within the framework of pan-Slavic ideological structures.
7. Undermining the national revolutionary movement: Through actions such as exposing and sabotaging uprisings and guerrilla movements, Russia directly opposed Bulgarian aspirations for independent liberation.

Russia, driven by strategic interests in the Straits and the Balkans, views Bulgaria not as an ally but as a tool for achieving its own geopolitical goals. As a result, the Bulgarian cause has often been neglected, while Bulgarian identity has been subjected to multifaceted threats from Russian policy.

Historical Facts – Russia and Bulgaria

In his pursuit of reaching Constantinople and the strategic Straits, the Moscow prince Ivan Vasilyevich directed his ambitions toward Great Bulgaria, known since 1445 as the Kazan Khanate. For over a century—from 1445 to 1552—Russia launched 13 bloody military campaigns against the “Bulgarian” city of Kazan, determined to bring this key region under its influence.

Russia and Bulgaria: 1501–1600

The years between 1552 and 1584 proved to be a dark and tragic period for the Volga Bulgars, descendants of the legendary Khan Kotrag. After Russian forces captured and devastated the capital, Kazan, they carried out mass killings, forcibly imposed Christianity, and destroyed the rich culture of this people. To solidify their dominance, the Russians rewrote history, declaring the Volga Bulgars to be part of the Tatar nation, erasing their true roots.

Russia and Bulgaria : 1700-1800

At the beginning of the 18th century, in the shadow of Ottoman rule, the Phanariots from Constantinople, supported by Russia, pursued an aggressive policy of de-Bulgarization in the territories north of the Danube. They sought to Hellenize cultural life by replacing Bulgarian traditions and values with Greek ones. At the same time, Bulgarians were systematically pushed out of governance and public structures, further undermining their identity in these lands.

In March 1711, Peter I issued a special manifesto in spoken Greek, addressed “to all Christians of the Orthodox Greek and Roman faith” in the regions of Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, as well as to the Montenegrins. In it, he declared his intention to liberate them from “pagan tyranny.” Despite the wide scope of this appeal, the document does not mention either Bulgaria or the Bulgarians.

Russia and Bulgaria : 1800-1850

On May 28, 1812, after a series of military conflicts, Russia and the Ottoman Empire signed the Treaty of Bucharest. Through this treaty, Russia annexed the region of Bessarabia, part of Moldova, predominantly inhabited by Bulgarians. Thus, the local population, against their will, became Russian subjects. Assimilation began there. How many Bulgarians remain there today?

During Nicholas I’s war against the Ottoman Empire in 1828–1829, the Bulgarian lands were subjected to devastating destruction. The Treaty of Adrianople brought new territorial gains for Russia and proclaimed the independence of Greece. For the Bulgarians, however, it marked yet another disappointment—Russia, the “Liberator,” once again sidelined them. Despite their widespread participation and great hopes for freedom, the Bulgarian people failed to achieve even limited autonomy, a principality in Dobruja, or one north of the Danube.

After the withdrawal of Russian troops, Georgi Mamarchev—a Bulgarian captain in Russian service and the uncle of Georgi Rakovski—took the initiative to organize Bulgarians from Kotel and Sliven for an independent struggle for liberation. However, the plans for an uprising were uncovered, not by the Ottoman authorities, but by Russian officers. Mamarchev was detained and accused of acting against Russian political interests, highlighting the complex position of Bulgarian revolutionaries in the context of the great powers.

Since the beginning of the 18th century, due to the continuous wars between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, over 500,000 Bulgarians were forcibly resettled to territories controlled by Russia. These events left a heavy toll—entire regions in Northwestern Bulgaria were depopulated and lost their Bulgarian character, becoming a testament to the dramatic fate of the people during the great geopolitical clashes.

Some of the clauses of the Treaty of Adrianople granted Russia the right to organize and control the resettlement of the Bulgarian population. Russian officers exploited this to manipulate and deceive Bulgarians, convincing them that if they remained in their homeland, they would fall victim to mass massacres by the Ottomans as an act of revenge. Driven by fear and uncertainty, around 60,000 people left their homes and resettled in the steppes of Bessarabia, leaving behind devastated villages and severed ties to their native land.

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With Russia’s support, Serbia managed to declare its independence, albeit as a vassal principality under Ottoman suzerainty. However, this opened the door to territorial ambitions toward Bulgarian lands, realized with Russian assistance. On November 7, 1833, after Sultan Mahmud II was bribed, he ceded to Serbia six districts inhabited by about 200,000 people who spoke pure Bulgarian. This not only expanded Serbian territories but also marked the beginning of the ongoing ethnic assimilation of these Bulgarian communities.

In 1841, the Nish Uprising, initiated by Bulgarians with hopes for liberation, received no support from the Great Powers. Even Serbia, which might have sided with them, maintained a cold neutrality. The reason was clear—the insurgents were fighting for their own freedom and independence, not for incorporation into Serbian territories, which did not align with the interests of Serbian rulers. Thus, deprived of external aid, the uprising failed to achieve its goals.

The Braila uprisings of 1841–1843 became yet another tragic chapter in the struggle for Bulgarian freedom, thwarted by the treachery of the Russo-Greek alliance against Bulgarian interests. During the first uprising in 1841, the Phanariots reneged on their promise to support the detachment of Captain Valkov. The raft intended to ferry the rebels across the Danube was deliberately sabotaged, ensuring an easy victory for the attackers. Most of the rebels were killed, and the survivors were captured. Later that year, Russian police uncovered another Bulgarian plot in Bessarabia and handed over the participants to the authorities in Wallachia, Moldavia, and Turkey, further undermining hopes for liberation.

During the Second Braila Uprisings, Rakovski was exposed and forced to seek protection from the Russian consul, believing it would offer him safety. Instead, the consul handed him over to the authorities, leading to his arrest and a death sentence. The only thing that saved him from execution was his Greek passport, which proved his affiliation with another state and shielded him from immediate execution. This case highlights the dangers and betrayals faced by freedom fighters in the complex geopolitical environment of the time.

Russia and Bulgaria : 1850-1900

During the Vidin Uprising of 1850, 118 villages from Northwestern Bulgaria appealed for support from Belgrade and Russia, believing they would receive assistance against Ottoman repression. Unfortunately, both parties refused to intervene. Russian troops remained passive while Turkish forces brutally suppressed the uprising, leaving the Bulgarians to fight for their freedom alone. This refusal of support underscores the lack of genuine allied backing for the Bulgarian cause and deepens the sense of abandonment among the people.

After the Crimean War, Russia began actively promoting the concept of so-called Pan-Slavism in the Balkan territories. This doctrine, aimed at the “unification” of all “Slavs” under the leadership of the Russian Empire, carried a strongly anti-European character. Despite its ostensible concern for the “Slavic” peoples, Pan-Slavism actually posed a threat to the independence and identity of all Balkan “Slavs,” including Bulgarians, as it risked replacing their aspirations for freedom with imperial ambitions.

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In 1861–1862, the last large-scale forced migration of Bulgarians to Russia took place, leaving behind tragic consequences. The Bulgarians were enticed with promises of financial support and a better life, but the reality turned out to be entirely different. In the newly established settler colonies, they faced harsh restrictions, including a ban on using their native language. During the migration, many perished, and those who survived, deceived in their expectations, often returned disillusioned. This event clearly demonstrates that Russia’s actions were driven solely by its imperial interests, with anti-Bulgarian policies being a key element in its strategy for dominating the Balkans.

Georgi Rakovski, Lyuben Karavelov, Vasil Levski, and Hristo Botev openly opposed Russian policies, exposing their true intentions and actions toward the Bulgarian people. They understood that Russian imperial interests did not include the freedom and prosperity of Bulgarians but rather served the goals of Russian expansion. Zahari Stoyanov encapsulated this sentiment with his poignant words, which resonated with the views of all the Bulgarian Revival figures: “They never appealed to her because they knew that her whip hurts more than the Turkish one…” These words emphasize the clear awareness of the danger that Russian interference posed to Bulgaria’s national independence.

In 1864, the Russian ambassador to Constantinople, Count Nikolay Ignatiev, a well-known Pan-Slavist, actively worked against Bulgarian aspirations for ecclesiastical independence. He persuaded the Ottoman Empire to refuse granting church autonomy to the Bulgarians, a key step in their struggle for national identity. Furthermore, Ignatiev advocated for the exile of leading figures in the Bulgarian movement for an independent church – Hilarion of Makariopolis, Hilarion of Lovech, and Paisius of Plovdiv – labeling them as “rebels.” These actions clearly demonstrate Russia’s unwillingness to support the Bulgarian cause as long as it did not align with its imperial ambitions.

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The Russian Orthodox Church supported the schism imposed by the Patriarchate of Constantinople, which declared the Bulgarian Exarchate excommunicated. Despite Russian interference and opposition, the Bulgarians succeeded independently in their ecclesiastical struggles, demonstrating determination and self-reliance. Lyuben Karavelov clearly expressed his conviction on this matter, stating: “We are convinced that if Russia had not meddled in our church affairs, the Bulgarian church question would have been resolved (in our favor) as early as 1858.” These words highlight Russia’s negative role and the Bulgarians’ ability to defend their interests without foreign intervention.

In 1867, with active support from Russia, a secret agreement was formed between Serbia and Greece, aimed at a potential partition of Bulgarian lands. This covert agreement is yet another testament to Russia’s strategic interests in the Balkans, which often diverged from the aspirations of Bulgarians for freedom and independence. Instead of supporting Bulgarian national ambitions, Russia facilitated plans that would deprive Bulgarians of their lands and identity, placing the region in a state of perpetual dependence and division.

The Dobrodetelna Druzhina, also known as “The Elders,” was an association of Bulgarian merchants in Romania that, due to financial dependence on Russia, often succumbed to its influence. This so-called “Committee of the Elders” developed a program for creating a dual monarchy governed by a Serbian prince, envisioning autonomy for Bulgaria. Despite Russian influence, the Dobrodetelna Druzhina staunchly defended Bulgarian interests, advocating for an independent Bulgarian Church and the establishment of ethnic borders encompassing Moesia, Thrace, and Macedonia. However, the plan was rejected by both Serbia and Russia, highlighting the complexity of the political maneuvers in the region.

Russia actively sought to eliminate the Bulgarian Secret Central Committee (BSCC) led by Ivan Kasabov, as its ideas for a Bulgarian-Turkish dualist state posed an obstacle to Russian ambitions for control over the Straits. Acting on the orders of Count Ignatiev, the Russian ambassador in Bucharest funded the Dobrodetelna Druzhina (“The Committee of the Elders”) and supported the creation of the Second Bulgarian Legion (1867), as well as the actions of the detachments led by Filip Totyu and Panayot Hitov. Through these moves, Russia managed to infiltrate and exert control over the Bulgarian revolutionary movement, using it as a tool for its Pan-Slavist strategy in the Balkans, thereby aligning the Bulgarian émigré community with its geopolitical goals.

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In 1868, with the support of Russia, the “Committee of the Elders” disclosed to the Ottoman authorities the plans for the actions of the detachment led by Hadzhi Dimitar and Stefan Karadja. This betrayal led to their tragic defeat and demise. Through this move, Russia undermined independent Bulgarian efforts for freedom, paving the way for a future liberation under its own leadership, thereby solidifying its influence over Bulgarian territories.

Russia fostered Serbia’s territorial claims on Macedonia and actively supported cultural and political propaganda aimed at denationalizing Bulgarians. In this context, Serbian schools were established, Serbian books and textbooks were distributed, and ideas were promoted among the population suggesting that the “true” Serbia included all Bulgarian lands from the Iskar River to Chirpan. Aegean Macedonia was declared to be inhabited by Serbo-Macedonians, while Eastern Thrace was portrayed as home to Serbo-Bulgarians and Serbomaniacs. This policy aimed to weaken Bulgarian identity and assimilate the national consciousness to serve Serbian interests.

The 1877–1878 war was forced upon Russia despite the empire being unprepared for another conflict. Exhausted by previous wars, burdened by ongoing reforms, facing a financial crisis, and diplomatically isolated without strategic allies in Europe, Russia’s decision to engage was not driven by genuine concern for the “brotherly” Bulgarians. Instead, it stemmed from fear of losing influence in the Balkans—a region vital to its geopolitical interests. The war was not about liberating Bulgaria but about maintaining strategic dominance in the area.

The secret negotiations between Russia and Austria-Hungary during 1876–1877 reveal the true intentions of Russia regarding Bulgarian lands—occupation and fragmentation. Article 3 of the Second Budapest Convention explicitly states that “the creation of a large, compact, or other ‘Slavic’ state is excluded” in the event of the Ottoman Empire’s dissolution. This clause underscores that Russia’s goal in the war was not the liberation of the Bulgarians but the establishment of a state dependent on Russian influence. Such a state would serve as a strategic foothold for future offensives toward Constantinople and control over the Straits—vital to Russia’s imperial ambitions.

The participation of the Bulgarian Volunteer Corps (Opalchentsi) in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 was conceived by Russia not as the foundation of a future Bulgarian national army, but rather as a propaganda tool. Its purpose was to present the war as a liberatory mission rather than a campaign of conquest. The volunteers’ training was conducted entirely under Russian directives, with the command structure composed exclusively of Russian officers and non-commissioned officers. Many of these were appointed as a form of disciplinary reassignment for offenses such as drunkenness. Even General Stoletov, the commander of the Volunteer Corps, stood out for his lack of noble lineage—a rarity in the Russian military—further indicating the low priority the Empire assigned to this unit.

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During their training, the Bulgarian volunteers were compelled to swear an oath of allegiance not to a future free Bulgaria, but to the Russian emperor and the Russian state. This underscores their role as an instrument of Russian policy rather than an independent national force. This act symbolizes Russia’s intent to solidify its control and influence, even over those fighting for the liberation of their homeland. The oath thus serves as yet another testament to the true objectives of Russian intervention in the Balkans: not to foster independence, but to ensure subordination to Russian imperial ambitions.

The “benevolent” attitude of the Russian command toward the Bulgarian volunteer corps was evident in its approach to their symbolism. The volunteers were not permitted to have their own flag reflecting their national identity and struggle. Hadzhi Dimitar Panichkov recounts that a flag was crafted by Ivan Parashkevov’s daughter, Shtilyana, but instead of being entrusted to the volunteers, it was ceremoniously taken by the Russian forces, after which it disappeared without a trace. Furthermore, even on the Samara flag, which became a symbol of the volunteers’ bravery, the word “Bulgarians” was notably absent. This highlights Russia’s intent to frame the war and the liberation cause as part of its own agenda, rather than fully supporting the national consciousness and aspirations of the Bulgarian people.

The weapons supplied by the Russian command to the Bulgarian volunteer corps were more suited for a museum than the battlefield. The rifles purchased from Germany were outdated and unreliable—they often malfunctioned in humid weather, shattered upon firing, and injured the shooters. The ammunition was equally unsuitable for real combat conditions. Made of pressed cardboard, the cartridges became unusable in rain or damp conditions, significantly limiting the volunteers’ combat effectiveness. On Shipka, under harsh weather conditions, these deficiencies proved particularly disastrous, underscoring the dismissive attitude of the Russian command toward properly equipping the Bulgarian fighters.

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During the Battle of Stara Zagora, General Gurko refrained from intervening, despite having the military capacity to prevent the tragedy. His inaction left the city and its Bulgarian population at the mercy of the Ottoman forces, who carried out a horrifying massacre. This lack of response is remembered as one of the darkest moments of the Russo-Turkish War, undermining confidence in the true intentions of the Russian command.

On March 3, 1878, the Treaty of San Stefano was signed without the presence of Bulgarian representatives, depriving the Bulgarian people of the opportunity to advocate for their own interests. All negotiations regarding the borders of the future Bulgarian state were conducted by Russian representatives in dialogue with the Ottoman side. This underscores the dependence of the process on Russian strategic objectives, leaving Bulgarians as mere observers of their own destiny.

The Treaty of San Stefano, signed on March 3, 1878, gave Russia the opportunity to strengthen its relations with Serbia and Romania at Bulgaria’s expense. The territorial compromises imposed in the treaty aimed to foster rivalry between Bulgarians and their neighboring peoples. Russia’s strategy was evident: to create enduring tensions and discord among the Balkan nations, enabling the empire to maintain and expand its influence in the region through active mediation and intervention.

After the 1877–1878 war, the so-called “liberators” of Bulgaria, the Russian troops, dismantled the Ottoman military presence in the country but did not leave it independent. Instead, they established a prolonged occupation of Bulgarian lands. During this period, the Bulgarian population was compelled to support the Russian divisions by providing sustenance, supplies, and resources for the army. This imposed a heavy economic and social burden on the local populace, underscoring that Russia’s “liberation mission” was accompanied by its own strategic and material interests.

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At the Berlin Congress in 1878, which was convened to determine the future of the Balkans after the war, Russia barred the participation of a Bulgarian delegation. Bulgarian representatives, eager to express their stance and defend the interests of their people, were excluded from the negotiations. Petitions and materials sent by Bulgarians in protest against the Congress’s unjust decisions were deliberately suppressed to prevent their consideration. This highlights Russia’s desire to control the process, disregarding the will of the Bulgarian people while advancing its own geopolitical interests.

According to Article 22 of the Berlin Treaty, Bulgaria was obligated to maintain the Russian occupation army, even though the Bulgarian people suffered significantly higher casualties in the war compared to the Russian army. Russia was granted the right to demand payment of an occupation debt, calculated at 10,618,250 rubles and 43 kopecks. This debt became a tool for political blackmail, with Russian authorities using it to pressure and subordinate Bulgarian politicians to their interests. At the same time, Russia failed to repay its debt to Bulgaria for the requisitioned forage and food supplies, valued at 4,340,000 gold francs. This unfulfilled obligation left a lasting sense of injustice and imposed a heavy economic burden on the Bulgarian people.

For many years following the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, the myth persisted that 200,000 Russian soldiers perished for Bulgaria’s liberation. This vastly inflated figure was used as a tool to instill submission in the Bulgarian populace, suggesting that refusing to align with Russian political interests would be tantamount to disrespecting the memory of the fallen soldiers. However, according to Russian sources, the actual number of casualties was significantly lower—22,391 soldiers. Nevertheless, as a gesture of gratitude and respect for their sacrifice, hundreds of monuments were erected across Bulgaria to commemorate their deeds.

At the Constituent Assembly convened on February 10, 1879, in Tarnovo to discuss the draft of Bulgaria’s first constitution, Russia did not allow representatives from Bulgarian territories that remained outside the newly established principality—Bessarabia, Macedonia, Dobruja, Rumelia, and Morava—to participate. This act highlights Russia’s reluctance to support the unification of all Bulgarians into a single state. The exclusion of representatives from these regions was a clear indication of Russia’s ambitions to exert control rather than genuinely promote the national unity of the Bulgarian people.

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Emperor Alexander III demonstrated a particular fixation on the Bulgarian question, driven by disdain for Prince Alexander Battenberg, whom he mockingly referred to as “that German,” and by pronounced distrust of the Bulgarian people. Isolated from potential allies, Alexander III became obsessed with the idea of controlling Constantinople, viewing the Balkan Peninsula entirely through the lens of Russian geopolitical interests. His statement, “For us, everything else on the Balkan Peninsula is of secondary importance. Now the ‘Slavs’ must serve Russia, not we them,” clearly reveals his strategy. This approach used the Balkan peoples as tools for Russian dominance, disregarding their own national aspirations and independent interests.

The coup of Prince Alexander Battenberg on April 27, 1881, was organized with the active support of Russia, which sought to strengthen its influence over the young Bulgarian state. General Ehrnroth, Prime Minister and a trusted confidant of Emperor Alexander III, played a key role in implementing this plan. Under his leadership and with the approval of the Russian authorities, proposals to increase the prince’s powers were drafted and submitted. Through this move, Russia aimed to create a political model in which Bulgarian governance remained directly dependent on the empire, thereby solidifying its position in the region and restricting the development of independent national institutions in Bulgaria.

To ensure the acceptance of these proposals, an ultimatum was issued: either they would be approved without discussion in the National Assembly, or Prince Battenberg would abdicate. The latter would have led to political chaos and destabilization in the newly established Bulgarian state. This strategy reflects Russia’s ambitions to control Bulgaria’s governance, using Battenberg as a tool to achieve its objectives.

Following the advice of General Ernrot, Prince Alexander Battenberg issued a decree that drastically altered Bulgaria’s governance by dividing the country into five administrative regions. Each region was headed by a Russian officer who was granted almost unlimited authority. This structure effectively established dictatorial control over the local administration, the military, and the police, all of which became entirely subordinate to the Russian officer.

To enforce this control, special courts were established, which operated with extreme severity. They provided for only two penalties: death or one month in prison. These measures demonstrated Russia’s desire to centralize power and limit Bulgaria’s autonomy, while at the same time ensuring stability in favor of its interests.

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The secret Russian occupation fund, created and managed by the Russian Consulate in Ruse, aims to strengthen Russian influence in Bulgaria. Through this fund, significant sums of money are allocated, which are used to finance various individuals and organizations necessary for conducting propaganda and agitation activities in favor of Russian interests.

These funds were directed to specific figures and groups that served to disseminate ideas consistent with Russian policy and to maintain public support for Russia’s actions in Bulgaria. This practice demonstrates the Russian Empire’s desire to manipulate the country’s domestic politics and maintain control over key aspects of Bulgarian society.

During the elections for the Grand National Assembly, the electoral system was used as a tool for manipulation and control, which undermined the democratic process. Voters were faced with an open election, where voting was done with two separate ballot boxes: one for the prince and the other against him.

This approach aroused fear of reprisals among voters, as voting against the prince was easily identified and often led to negative consequences for those who dared to express disagreement. This practice shows a strong limitation of free will and democratic choice, while at the same time strengthening authoritarian control over political life in Bulgaria.

On June 8, 1881, prominent public figures and politicians such as Petko R. Slaveykov, Petko Karavelov, Dragan Tsankov and Nikola Suknarov were fined for their attempt to inform and mobilize the people to defend democratic principles and the Constitution. They issued a public warning, calling on citizens to reject the strengthening of princely power, which could lead to the restriction of freedoms and rights enshrined in the Tarnovo Constitution.

This reaction by the authorities clearly demonstrates the unwillingness to accept pluralism and free debate in society. The fine serves as a means to suppress opposition voices and strengthen autocratic control, depriving the people of the opportunity to openly participate in the political process.

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In 1883, Alexander Nelidov headed the Russian embassy in Constantinople, his main task being to gather information and prepare a strategy for the eventual conquest of the Straits. In his reports to Emperor Alexander III, Nelidov outlined the need to control the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, citing them as key to Russian political, commercial, and military interests.

He emphasizes that Russia must be prepared to act quickly and decisively in the event of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. According to Nelidov, this is of utmost importance for ensuring Russian access to the World Ocean and strengthening the Empire’s geopolitical influence.

His vision of “outrunning rivals” implies active preparation for the conquest of strategic straits at a time when the international situation allows or when there is a risk of them falling under foreign control. This position is clear evidence of Russia’s continuing ambitions in the region and the pursuit of dominance in the Balkans.

On 28 February 1883, under strong pressure from Russia, Prince Alexander Battenberg dismissed the conservative politicians Konstantin Stoilov, Grigor Nachovich and Dimitar Grekov from the government. This action led to the appointment of a new government composed almost entirely of Russians or individuals dependent on Russia. On 3 March 1883, General Sobolev was appointed Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, and General Kaulbars was appointed Minister of War.

The new cabinet was dominated by Russian military and bureaucrats, who actively maintained contact with the prince through Gen. Sobolev. Its main goal was to strengthen Russian influence in Bulgaria, but its policies were often seen as detrimental to Bulgarian national interests.

Over time, Prince Battenberg began to realize that unconditionally following Russian directives not only limited Bulgaria’s independence but also undermined his own position as a state leader. This realization became an important stage in the establishment of the idea of greater autonomy for Bulgaria in its domestic and foreign policy.

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On September 6, 1883, the proxy regime, imposed with the support of Russia, collapsed. Prince Alexander Battenberg realized the serious dangers of complete submission to Russian wishes and restored the Tarnovo Constitution. This event marked a key moment in Bulgarian politics, as it strengthened the autonomy of the young state and signaled its readiness to oppose the excessive influence of Russia.

This move significantly worsened Bulgarian-Russian relations. Russian diplomacy began active actions to weaken Prince Battenberg’s position, spreading intrigues and devising plans for his removal from the throne.

The restoration of the constitution was perceived as an act of opposition to Russian interference, which further exacerbated tensions between Bulgaria and the Russian Empire. As a result, Bulgaria entered a period of complex diplomatic and domestic political trials that determined its future direction towards greater independence and self-determination.

After 1883, Russian-Bulgarian relations deteriorated further, with Emperor Alexander III accusing Prince Alexander Battenberg of deviating from Russian policy and seeking to orient himself towards the Western powers. The Russian Tsar saw Battenberg as a threat to Russian influence in Bulgaria, leading to a series of actions aimed at limiting the autonomy of the young Bulgarian state.

The culmination of these events occurred in 1885, when Russia declared itself against the Unification of the Principality of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia. Instead of supporting this act of national unification, Russia undertook manipulative diplomatic actions, including attempts to incite the Ottoman Empire to military intervention in southern Bulgaria. This behavior clearly demonstrated Russia’s intentions to maintain its control over the region and prevent the strengthening of an independent and united Bulgaria.

The words of G. Valkovich – “The Russians are omnipotent, they will take over Bulgaria, but through the Bulgarians” – reflect the cynical understanding of Russia’s strategy. It aims to use internal discord and political manipulation to impose its will, without direct military intervention. Despite these obstacles, the Unification was successfully implemented thanks to the determination of the Bulgarian people and army, demonstrating the will for national self-determination, regardless of external pressure.

Russia and Bulgaria: THE UNION with Eastern Rumelia

Russia perceived the 1885 Union as a serious obstacle to its imperial goals in the Balkans. It saw the unification of the Principality of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia as a threat to its control over Bulgaria and as a threat to its hopes of using it as a puppet state. In 1886, this dissatisfaction escalated, with Russia breaking off diplomatic relations with Bulgaria.

In response to Russian attempts to intervene, Stefan Stambolov, who then held a key political position, openly opposed Russia. He condemned the actions of Emperor Alexander III and his strategy to dominate Bulgaria. Stambolov pursued a policy aimed at affirming national independence and limiting Russian influence, which frustrated Russia’s plans to subjugate Bulgaria. Under his leadership, the country oriented itself towards Western Europe in order to balance the forces.

However, in 1895–1896, in order to improve relations with Russia, Prince Ferdinand took steps towards reconciliation, which included the sacrifice of Stefan Stambolov. Stambolov’s assassination in 1895 marked the end of an era of active opposition to Russian ambitions. The prince justified this move as a necessity for the normalization of diplomatic relations. However, Russia was forced to make some compromises, as it realized that Bulgaria was not ready to submit unconditionally, especially since events proved the determination of the Bulgarian people to defend their independence and freedom.

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During the reign of Stefan Stambolov (1887-1894), Russia felt the growing threat of his policies, which confidently established Bulgaria as the leading power in the Balkans. However, the constant intervention of the Empire prevented Bulgaria from establishing itself as a fully sovereign European state. Russian pressure reached the point where numerous conspiracies and assassinations were organized against Stambolov himself and his independent policies.

On August 9, 1886, a coup d’état against Prince Alexander Battenberg took place in Bulgaria, led with the clear support and anti-constitutional intervention of Russia. This action caused a serious political crisis both domestically and internationally. The coup was organized by Bulgarian officers, supporters of Russophile ideas, who were skillfully manipulated and incited by Russian diplomacy under the guise of a patriotic cause for the good of Bulgaria.

After November 6, 1886, Russia began a deliberate campaign to overthrow the Regency and government in Bulgaria. By financing it from the occupation fund and organizing conspiracies, rebellions, and so-called “popular movements,” Russian policy actively undermined stability in the country. These actions, marked by hostility to Bulgarian independence, led to seriously strained relations between the two countries and clearly demonstrated the Bulgarophobic approach of Russian diplomacy.

Russia categorically refused to recognize Ferdinand’s election as Bulgarian prince, managing to thwart the approval of the Great Powers on the matter. The reason for this position was that Ferdinand, supported by Austria-Hungary – Russia’s main rival for supremacy in the Balkans, represented a serious obstacle to Russian ambitions. The emperor’s resistance to the legitimization of the new prince not only blocked Bulgaria’s international recognition, but also seriously disrupted the process of stabilization of the Principality that had begun during the time of Stambolov.

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The Russian Empire sought to form an anti-Bulgarian alliance among the Great Powers, relying on the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin, secretly cherishing the hope that Ferdinand would be removed from power. Despite extensive efforts and diplomatic intrigues, these attempts proved unsuccessful, and another failure of Russian anti-Bulgarian policy highlighted the empire’s inability to achieve its goals in the region.

Russia undertook diplomatic manipulations and put pressure on the Ottoman Empire, trying to convince the Sultan, as the suzerain of the Principality of Bulgaria, to declare Ferdinand an illegitimate ruler. The plan is for this to lead to the removal of the prince. Despite efforts, the Sultan refused to comply with Russian demands, which thwarted all attempts to overthrow Ferdinand and solidified his position on the Bulgarian throne.

In the period 1887–1894, numerous rebellions, assassinations, and conspiracies were organized against the Bulgarian government, Prince Ferdinand and Stefan Stambolov. These actions were meticulously planned and generously funded by the Russian Foreign Ministry department, aimed at destabilizing the country and weakening its independence.

During the Eastern Crisis (1894–1898), the strategic importance of Bulgaria for Russia increased significantly, forcing the Empire to recognize Prince Ferdinand. However, this recognition is not the result of a sincere truce, but a tool for realizing Russia’s imperial ambitions. The “reconciliation” led to the creation of a dependency that allowed Russia to exert influence over Bulgarian politics through the obedience of Ferdinand, used as a means of control.

Russia and Bulgaria: 1900 – 1918

Russia does not respect Bulgarian national interests and actively opposes key issues such as the issuance of berats for Bulgarian bishops in Macedonia, the revolutionary efforts of the Bulgarians, and reforms aimed at protecting the Bulgarian population in the Ottoman Empire. Despite the favorable conditions during the Eastern Crisis, the government of Konstantin Stoilov and the Russophile policy did not lead to significant gains for Bulgaria. During the reign of St. Danev (1901–1903), Russia used its supporters in the country to achieve anti-Bulgarian goals, which weakened national diplomacy and led to severe consequences for the country.

The declaration of Bulgarian Independence created new tensions and deepened the rift in relations between Russia and Bulgaria. The only reason why Russia accepts the current situation is related to its expectations for new gains and opportunities to influence Bulgaria’s domestic politics.

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Russia opposed the actions of the VMOK, including the Cheta in 1895, as well as key uprisings such as the Gornojumayskoe in 1902 and the Ilinden-Preobrazhenskoe in 1903. The reason for this position is Russia’s desire to prevent any possibilities for the restoration of Greater Bulgaria, which would disrupt its geopolitical plans in the Balkans.

At the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, Russian diplomats Zinoviev, Mashkov, and Yastrebov, holding key positions as ambassadors and consuls in Europe and Constantinople, actively pursued an anti-Bulgarian policy. They not only supported Serbian-Greek propaganda, but also encouraged the Ottoman authorities to increase pressure on the Bulgarian population in the detached territories. These actions aim to undermine Bulgaria’s aspirations for national unification and strengthening of independence.

Russia, through skillful manipulation, created a triple alliance between Turks, Greeks, and Serbs, aimed against Bulgarian influence in Macedonia. This alliance aims to destroy the IMORO and liquidate the Bulgarian Exarchate by weakening the positions of the Bulgarians in the region. Through systematic deportation and repression against the Bulgarian population in Macedonia, the ground is being prepared for the division of the territory, with parts of it planned for distribution between Russia and its Balkan allies, acting as its pawns.

Russia and Bulgaria | Russia and Bulgaria

In 1912-1913, during the Balkan War, Russia found an opportunity to take revenge on Bulgaria for its irreconcilable position and independent policy. Through diplomatic manipulation and pressure, she instigated the creation of an alliance between Turkey, Greece, Serbia, and Romania against Bulgaria. This unification led to catastrophic consequences for the country, culminating in the First National Catastrophe, leaving lasting wounds on Bulgarian statehood and national spirit.

Russia’s anti-Bulgarian policy at the beginning of the 20th century exacerbated relations between the two countries, pushing Bulgaria to orient itself towards an alliance with Germany. This became a decisive factor in Bulgaria’s involvement in World War I on the side of the Central Powers. In the period from 1915 to 1918, the Bulgarian and Russian armies faced each other on the battlefield. After Russia’s capitulation in 1918, the conflict between the two countries temporarily subsided, but Bulgaria’s strategic importance to Russian ambitions remained unchanged, with the country continuing to be at the center of the Empire’s grand goals.

Much of the information is taken from “The Russian Empire against Bulgaria” (three volumes) by Yanko Gochev, ed. Aniko, 2006, as well as from other sources that shed light on the complex Bulgarian-Russian relations in a historical context.

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